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THE NON-CONTRACTUAL LIAbILITy Of THE EU  
– CASE STUDy Of ŠumelJ CASE
ABSTRACT
The EU is in obligation to cover the damage to member states and individuals on behalf of the 
institution that caused it. There is contractual and non-contractual liability of the EU. The 
aim of this paper is to discuss the non-contractual liability of the EU with special reference 
to joint liability of the EU and member states. In that sense, we will discuss the case “Šumelj 
and Others v Commission”, which is the first Croatian case before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). The action was brought before the General Court on 20 October 
2013. The applicants claimed that the Commission had breached its obligation to monitor 
the implementation of the Treaty concerning the accession of the Republic of Croatia to the 
European Union, under Article 36 to the Act of Accession. The General Court recently issued 
a negative decision. The applicants lodged an appeal to the Court of Justice but the Court con-
firmed General Court’s decision So, we analyse the judgment of the General Court.
Keywords : “Šumelj and Others v. EU’’, CJEU, non-contractual liability
1. INTRODUCTION
The EU is in obligation to cover the damage caused to member states and individ-
uals, on behalf of the institution that caused it. There is contractual and non-con-
tractual liability of the EU. The aim of this paper is to discuss the non-contractual 
liability of the EU with special reference to joint liability of the EU and member 
states. In that sense, we will analyse the case Šumelj and Others v Commission.1
The paper is divided into four parts. Following the introductory first part, the sec-
ond part will describe non-contractual liability of the EU for damage and review 
1  See case:  T-546/13 - Šumelj and Others v Commission [2016] ECLI:EU:T:2016:107.
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the relevant Articles 340(2) TFEU and 268 TFEU. In terms of substantive condi-
tions of liability, Article 340(2) refers to general principles common to the laws of 
member states. Seeing as how Treaty itself does not define the conditions, it is at 
the discretion of the CJEU to define them through case law. The second part of 
the paper will thus analyse the above two Treaty articles, but also the relevant case 
law of the CJEU to answer the following questions: who has active legal standing 
(locus standi) to bring an action; who is the action brought against; within what 
time limit; what constitutes a claim; which court is the action brought before; 
what are the conditions of liability for damage, with particular focus on the legal 
concept of the so-called joint liability. We will also reflect on the interrelation of 
this action and actions for annulment and actions for failure to act.2
The third part of the paper is divided into three sections. Section 3.1 outlines the 
facts of the case that lead to bringing both the actions for damage before national 
courts and to bringing the action for damage before the General Court pursuant 
to Article 340(2) TFEU. In section 3.2, we considered it necessary to describe the 
proceedings before the national courts. In section 3.3 we analyse the decision of 
the General Court. Even though a complaint was lodged against the decision of 
the General Court to the Court of Justice, the latter rejected the complaint and 
confirmed the findings of the General Court. We will thus analyse only the deci-
sion of the General Court and point to the contradictions in the decision itself. 
Lastly, the final, fourth part of the paper, will give concluding remarks and suggest 
possible further legal steps.
2. NON-CONTRACTUAL LIAbILITy fOR DAMAGE
It is necessary to distinguish between contractual and non-contractual liability of 
the Union for damage. Article 340(1) TFEU governs contractual liability for dam-
age that is regulated by the law applicable to the concerned contract.3 The discus-
sion on contractual liability will be omitted given that the subject of our interest 
is non-contractual liability, as stipulated under Article 340(2): 
2  This paper is partly based on a chapter of the book Postupci pred Sudom EU. See: Petrašević, T., Postupci 
pred sudom EU in Ljubanović, B. et al. Procesno-pravni aspekti prava EU, Faculty of Law in Osijek, 
Osijek, 2016. The research was complemented by the contribution of the co-author Mato Krmek, who 
was a representative in the case T-546/13 – Šumelj and Others v Commission.
3  For more on contractual liability of the EU see: Hartley, T.C, Foundation of EC Law, Pravni fakultet 
Sveučilišta u Rijeci, 2012. (version translated in Croatian), pp. 443-447, Petrašević, T., op.cit., note 2, 
p. 54 and Barents, R.; Remedies and Procedures before the EU Courts (Bresese, Helen E., ed.), Walters 
Kluwer, 2012., pp. 324-325.
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In the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the 
general principles common to the laws of the member states, make good any dam-
age caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.
The above article should be read in conjunction with Article 268 TFEU:
The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in disputes 
relating to compensation for damage provided for in the second and third para-
graphs of Article 340.
Below we will analyse the two articles, but also the relevant case law of the CJEU 
to answer to the following questions: who has active legal standing (locus standi) 
to bring an action; who is the action brought against; within what time limit; 
what constitutes a claim; which court is the action brought before; what are the 
conditions of liability for damage, with particular focus on the legal concept of the 
so-called joint liability. We will also reflect on the interrelation of this action and 
actions for annulment and actions for failure to act.  
As regards active legal standing, an action may be brought by member states and 
natural and legal persons. It should be noted that the disputes between civil ser-
vants of the EU and the EU itself (i.e. its institutions), including the issue of com-
pensation for damage, are regulated under the separate Article 270 TFEU and are 
under first-instance jurisdiction of the Civil Service Tribunal.4 Civil servants thus 
do not have active legal standing under Article 268 TFEU.5
Passive legal standing is that of the Union, i.e. of the institution that is ascribed 
with the conduct that caused the liability of the EU for damage. If a joint act is 
involved (e.g. of the Council of the EU and the Parliament), they are jointly (co-)
liable.6 Passive legal standing should be distinguished from the power (i.e. right) 
of representation of EU before the courts. As regards representation before EU 
courts, the Union is regularly represented by the Commission. If the damage was 
caused by the European Central Bank (ECB), pursuant to Article 340(3) TFEU, 
the action is then brought directly against the ECB and not the EU.7 Interestingly, 
4  The reform of the CJEU that foresees the abolition of the Civil Service Tribunal is ongoing. See: Reg-
ulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2015 amending Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union [2015] 
OJ L 341, pp. 14–17, par. 9.
5  Petrašević, op.cit.note 2, p. 54.
6  Ibid., p. 55.See also: Hartley, op.cit. note 3,  p. 451.
7  Art. 340(3) TFEU: ‘Notwithstanding the second paragraph, the European Central Bank shall, in accord-
ance with the general principles common to the laws of the member states, make good any damage caused by 
it or by its servants in the performance of their duties.’’
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the time limits for bringing actions are not defined under the Treaty itself, so that 
the relevant provision here is that of Article 46 to the Statute of the CJEU stating 
that the right of action expires after a period of five years from the occurrence of 
adverse events giving rise to such action.8
The action is brought against a respective institution of the EU for compensation 
of damages caused by unlawful conduct or failure to act. Thus, the damage may 
arise from unlawful conduct or failure to act. 
Article 256 TFEU implicitly provides that the competent court for actions of in-
dividuals (natural and legal persons) is the General Court, and for the actions of 
member states the Court of Justice.9
Whereas earlier prevalent understanding was that actions for damage compensa-
tion had to be based on a previously established violation that gave rise to an ac-
tion for annulment or for failure to act, the position adopted by the Court of Jus-
tice today is that it involves an independent action. Such action in fact represents 
a supplement to the mechanism of protection of the individual that allows him to 
bring such an action and have legal standing therefor even if he did not have legal 
standing for an action for annulment of an act of the EU or an action for failure 
to act.10 Of course, this leaves room for manipulation in the sense that individuals 
might bring such actions in cases where they could not prove active legal standing 
that gave rise to the action for annulment or action for failure to act, or when they 
failed to bring an action in the strict statutory period of two months. 
As regards the criteria (conditions) of liability, the Treaty (Article 340) refers to 
general principles of rights common to the legal systems of member states. This 
gave a considerable freedom to the CJEU to define the conditions of liability. 
According to settled case law for liability of the Union for damage, several cumu-
lative conditions are required. Primarily, the conduct of the institution must be 
illegal. Further, the damage to an individual must exist and there must be a causal 
link.11 Where one of the conditions is absent, the CJEU will not examine the 
8  Petrašević, T., op. cit. note 2, p. 54.. See also: Hartley,op.cit. note 3, p. 451.
9  See: Art. 256 TFEU. See: Petrašević, op.cit. note 2, p. 55.
10  See: Petrašević, op. cit. note 2, p. 54 and Meškić, Z., Samardžić, D., Pravo Evropske unije I, GIZ, Sara-
jevo, 2012, p. 444.
11  Regarding the criteria of liability see the following cases: Oleifici Mediterranei v EEC,26/81 
[1982] ECLI:EU:C:1982:318, par. 16. and T-383/00 Beamglow v Parliament and Others [2005] 
ECLI:EU:T:2005:453, par. 95. See also a more recent case T-309/10 Christoph Klein v Commission 
[2011] ECLI:EU:T:2011:262(not yet published) and appeal C-120/14 P Klein v Commission [2014]
ECLI:EU:T:2014:19.
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES260
remaining conditions.12 The CJEU is also not obliged to examine the existence of 
the conditions in a specific order.13
Of particular interest to us is the so-called concurrent liability or joint liability of 
the EU and one or more member states that exists where the EU had not taken 
adequate measures to prevent violation of the EU law by the national authorities 
of a member state. This thesis was developed by the CJEU in the case Lütticke.14 In 
this paper, we are most interested in cases of inadequate supervision of the Com-
mission over the proper application of the EU law at a national level.15
In terms of joint liability, it is important to note that it is not possible to bring a 
single/joint action against the EU and a member state before the same court, since 
the national court has jurisdiction over determining the liability of the state and 
the CJEU the liability of the EU. It is thus necessary to bring two separate actions. 
The position of the CJEU is that the applicant would first have to exhaust the legal 
remedies available in national law. This however does not exclude simultaneously 
bringing actions to the national court and the EU courts.16 In our particular case 
Šumelj and Others v Commission (T-546/13), the applicants used that very possi-
bility and brought an action for damages before the CJEU (concretely to General 
Court) and not the national judiciary, for the reason that they deemed the General 
Court would decide the case faster and – more importantly – be impartial therein. 
The only proceedings that the applicants initiated before national courts were 
those before the Constitutional Court in which they challenged the constitution-
ality of laws that terminated their service, but nothing related to compensation 
for damages.17
As regards the liability of the Union for damage, the key question is that of dis-
cretion enjoyed by the respective/liable institution. The CJEU has a different ap-
proach depending on whether the respective body did or did not have discretion 
in their actions. Where one institution had reduced discretion or none at all, 
the very violation of the EU law can suffice for determining the existence of a 
12  See case; C-146/91, KYDEP v Council and Commission[1994] ECLI:EU:C:1994:329, par. 81 and 
T-170/00 Förde-Reederei v Council and Commission [2002] ECLI:EU:T:2002:34, par. 37.
13  See case: C-257/98Lucaccioni v Commission [1999]ECLI:EU:C:1999:402 , par. 13.
14  See case: Joined cases 31/62 and 33/62Milchwerke Heinz Wöhrmann & Sohn KG and Alfons Lütticke 
GmbH v Commission of the EEC [1962] ECLI:EU:C:1962:49.
15  See: Kawczyńska, M., Concurrent Liability of the EU and member states, URL=http://eulaw.pl/data/
documents/M.-Kawczynska_CONCURRENT-LIABILITy-OF-THE-EUROPEAN-UNION.pdf. 
Accessed 1. Febraury 2017,
16  See: Barents, R., op. cit., note 3, pp. 334-335.
17  Please note that the public bailiffs (71 of them) were not unified and not all chose to bring an action 
to the General Court; those who did, did not have the same legal representative. 
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sufficiently flagrant violation.18 Where the body did have discretion, the decisive 
factor is whether the EU institution manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits 
of its discretion.19 It was precisely the first Croatian case before the CJEU (T-
546/13 Ante Šumelj and Others v European Commission) that raised the question 
of whether the Commission overstepped the limits of its powers. We will analyse 
the case in more detail below, but we would first like to point out that the CJEU 
in the case Kampffemeyer20 already commented on the discretion enjoyed by the 
Commission. Where a body has no discretion, the very failure to act or failure to 
fulfil obligations is sufficient to give rise to liability for damage. 
Key to determining liability of the Union, regardless of whether discretion was en-
joyed or not, is the existence of the criterion of “a sufficiently flagrant violation.”21
The fact that the Commission adopted a formal measure for approving a national 
measure or conduct contrary to EU law goes in favour of the individual/the in-
jured party. But, to avoid the injured party being insufficiently or excessively com-
pensated by the national court and the CJEU, the rule is that the CJEU will not 
decide on the application until the national court delivers its final decision of on 
the amount of damage. The position of the CJEU is to wait for the decision of 
the national court on compensation. Thus, in accordance with the decision of the 
CJEU in the case Kampffmeyer22, clearly the EU can be liable for damage (together 
with the member state) if it authorized a measure of national authorities that is 
contrary to EU law. We believe that this is analogous to the situation in the case 
Šumelj and Others v European Commission as analysed below. 
18  In case Schöppenstedt the CJEU developed the test for establishing non-conractual liability which uis 
further extended and explained in case Bergaderm. See: and C-352/98 P - Bergaderm and Goupil v 
Commission [2000]ECLI:EU:C:2000:361, par. 43 and 44.In Bergaderm, the Court of Justice equilized 
the conditions under which Union institutions incur liability with conditions for liability of Member 
States. See more in: Mlinarić, M., Sufficiently Serious Breach Requirement for Obtaining Reparation of 
Damages in Union Law, diploma paper, Pravni fakultet Zagreb, 2016, p. 14-16. More about flagrant 
violations/serious breach see: Craig, P., De Burca, G., EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, Fourth edi-
tion, Oxford, 2011., pp.561-563.
19  See case: C-282/05 P Holcim (Deutschland) AG v Commission of the European Communities [2007] 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:226 and T-28/03 - Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission, 
20  See case: Firma E. Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission of the EEC [2005]ECLI:EU:T:2005:139, 
Joined cases 5, 7 and 13 to 24-66 [1967] ECLI:EU:C:1967:31. 
21  Petrašević, op.cit., note 2, p. 56.
22 Op.cit., note 20.
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3.    ANALySES Of CASE T-546/13 - ŠUMELJ AND OTHERS V. 
COMMISSION
3.1.  background of the Case
With their action brought to the General Court on 20 October 2013, the ap-
plicants sought that the General Court deliver an order to the EU to cover dam-
age (material and non-material) to Mr. Šumelj and other applicants, which they 
suffered on the basis of non-contractual liability of the EU in accordance with 
Article 340(2) TFEU. They argued that the European Commission had breached 
its obligation to monitor the implementation of the Treaty concerning the acces-
sion of the Republic of Croatia to the EU under Article 36 of the Act of Accession 
(Annex VII, par. 1)regarding the introduction of the public bailiff service in the 
legal system of the Republic of Croatia.
The background of the case is as follows. As part of accession negotiations (Chap-
ter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights), the Republic of Croatia undertook 
the obligation to reform its judiciary. To this end, in December 2010 the Croatian 
Parliament adopted the 2011-2015 Judicial Reform Strategy”.23 To improve the 
enforcement system, a new legislative framework had been adopted. A number 
of acts were passed, but the key is the Public Bailiffs Act24 that was passed in No-
vember 2010 and was expected to enter into force on 1 January 2012. The said 
Act provided for the transfer of enforcement powers from the courts to the public 
bailiffs. The applicants passed the public bailiff exam and the Minister of Justice 
appointed them to the function of public bailiffs. These bailiffs had legitimate ex-
pectations of commencing their new duties beginning of 2012. In the meantime, 
the Accession Treaty25 was signed on 9 December 2011. In its Article 36, the Act 
of Accession, which forms an integral part of the Treaty of Accession, provides 
for the monitoring by the Commission of the commitments undertaken by the 
Republic of Croatia during the accession negotiations, including the obligation 
to establish a public bailiff service and to establish all conditions necessary for the 
full implementation of that service. However, the exact opposite happened. On 
22 December 2011, the Croatian Parliament postponed the entry into force of the 
disputed Act until 1 July 2012 and then until 15 October 2012. Following this, 
on 15 October 2012 the Croatian Government proposed the Act Repealing the 
Public Bailiffs Act and abolished the public bailiff service. This decision was taken 
23  See: The Judicial Reform Strategy 2011-2015 (OG 145/10).  
24  See: Public Bailiffs Act (OG 139/10).
25  See: Treaty of Accession between the member states of the European Union and the Republic of Cro-
atia [2012] OJ L 112.
Tunjica Petrašević, Mato Krmek: THE NON-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF THE EU ... 263
without reasonable explanation and without proposals for compensation and by 
stating tacit approval of the Commission.
The position held by the applicants (and supported by the authors)is the fact that 
one of the conditions for closing “Chapter 23” was the introduction of public 
bailiffs in the legal system of the Republic of Croatia. 
Furthermore, another important fact is that in September 2012, Mr Šumelj (as 
the main applicant in this case) sent a letter to the Commission, in which he invit-
ed the Commission to take necessary measures to warn the Croatian Government 
of their failure to meet obligations under the Accession Treaty.26 Therefore, the 
Commission was called upon to act, but the letter did not produce an adequate 
response of the Commission. Given that the facts came into occurrence prior to 
formal accession, the Commission could not bring an action against the member 
state for violation of EU law before the CJEU, but we do hold that the Commis-
sion might and should have warned the Croatian Government of not fulfilling its 
obligations. 
The General Court accepted the action and two years later found that the Com-
mission (i.e. EU) was not liable for any damage.27 The applicants lodged an appeal, 
but on 1 February 2017 the Court of Justice dismissed the appeal as unfounded.
We are truly surprised by the decision of the Court of Justice as we expected that 
the Court would examine the case in more detail than the General Court.28 Given 
that the Court of Justice only confirmed the findings of the General Court, we 
will analyse the decision of the General Court. But we consider it necessary to first 
state what is (and had been) happening before the national courts. 
3.2.  Proceedings before National Courts 
After the Public Bailiffs Act was repealed, Ante Šumelj applied for constitutional 
review of several acts: the Enforcement Act, the Act Repealing the Public Bailiffs 
Act and the Act Repealing the Public Bailiff Fees Act. By its ruling of 23 April 
2012, the Constitutional Court dismissed the application for constitutional re-
view, but acknowledged the violation of legitimate expectations of 71 persons 
appointed public bailiffs by the Minister of Justice under the Public Bailiffs Act, as 
26  Letter is mentioned in par. 20 of the judgment in case Šumelj, infra n. 27.
27  Judgment of the General Court of 26 February 2016. Please note that the General Court joined cas-
es T-546/13, T-108/14 and T-109/14 and issued a joint decision.
28  See: Order of 1st February 2017, C-239/16 P Šumelj and Others v Commission [2017] ECLI:EU:C: 
2017:91.
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES264
well as their right to redress in a lump sum net amount of 18,000.00 HRK.29 The 
said amount is certainly disproportionate to the damage they suffered. However, 
the Constitutional Court said that “the redress does not affect the general right of each 
person appointed public bailiff to seek in court proceedings damages incurred pursuant 
to the general rules of the law on obligations. The redress shall not be included in the 
calculation of that possible court indemnity.”30
Importantly, the Constitutional Court further stated that this was a case of viola-
tion of the acquis.31
As a result, public bailiffs brought individual applications for damages incurred to 
national courts. These proceedings are pending. To our knowledge, thus far only 
one court requested data for the purposes of a financial expertise by the Ministry 
of Justice. There is however an interim judgment of the court in Varaždin that 
established liability of the Republic of Croatia for damage, but did not decide on 
amount of damages.32 Presumably, the national court waited for the decision of 
the Luxembourg courts. 
In the particular case ‘’Šumelj’’, the applicants decided to bring the action for 
damages to the General Court first. 
3.3.  Commentary on the Decision of the General Court 
Below we will give a critical review of the decision of the General Court and point 
out discrepancies and contradictions. 
First, the General Court claimed that it did not find any provisions in EU law 
establishing liability of the Commission: “The applicants have therefore failed 
to establish that the Commission had caused them to have a legitimate expectation 
and had thus, by its failure to act, breached the principle of protection of legitimate 
expectations.”33 The General Court further concluded that there was no wrongful 
29  Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. U-I-5612/2011 and others of 23 
January 2013.
30 Ibid., part III.
31 Ibid., par. 22. 
32  An action brought by Marko Lapaine, claiming damages of 1.6 mil HRK from the state. In addition to 
damages, Lapaine is claiming annuity until his retirement on the grounds of loss of expected profit. In 
anticipation of commencement of his public bailiff duties, Lapaine deregistered from the Bar Associa-
tion, but has not been allowed re-admission to the Association to this day. The proceedings are pending 
before the Supreme Court and the authors are not familiar with the status thereof. See: URL=http://
www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/javni-ovrsitelj-dobio-tuzbu-drzavu-cekaju-milijunske-odstete-923880. Ac-
cessed 1 March 2017. 
33 Ibid., par. 77.
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omission by the Commission as one of the three conditions of liability for dam-
age.34 Consequently, there is no liability of the EU for damage.35
We agree that the Commission did not directly create any legitimate expectations 
for applicants, but the Croatian Government, i.e. the Croatian Parliament did by 
adopting the Public Bailiffs Act. The violation was undoubtedly committed by the 
Croatian Government, but the Commission turned a blind eye to this omission. 
The question is: why? Had there really been a tacit agreement between the Gov-
ernment and the Commission? 
In our view, this case is a classic example of joint liability of the EU and a member 
state. Firstly, the Croatian Government undoubtedly committed a violation and 
the Commission approved it. The joint liability of the Commission is twofold. On 
the one hand, the Commission did not take adequate steps to prevent a breach 
of EU law by national authorities. In this regard, the breach was constituted by 
tacit consent of the Commission.36 On the other hand, the Commission adopted 
a more formal measure – the Final report, thereby approving the illegal national 
action. It is thus clear that the Commission legitimized the unlawful conduct of 
the Croatian Government both by failing to take adequate action as well as by is-
suing a positive report on the fulfilment of all obligations in negotiations, which 
was the basis for signing the Treaty of Accession..   
Secondly, not only did the General Court not acknowledge the legitimate expecta-
tions of the public bailiffs and establish liability of the Commission for damage, 
but it also aggravated their legal position in the proceedings before the national 
courts. We will explain our viewpoint. As previously, mentioned,(parallel) pro-
ceedings for damages are pending before national courts. In its decision, the Con-
stitutional Court concluded that there had been a violation of legitimate expecta-
tions under the acquis, or in other words – that a violation of the rights under EU 
law existed. In par. 51, the General Court states the following: “Commitment 1 
therefore does not give rise to any obligation for the Croatian authorities to establish the 
office of Public Bailiff.”37 The General Court thus very clearly concludes that there 
34  See par. 77: ‘’It follows from all of the foregoing that the Commission cannot be criticised for any wrongful 
omission.’’
35  See par. 78:  ‘’It follows that one of the three cumulative conditions of EU liability is not satisfied and that 
the present actions must therefore be dismissed, without there being any need to examine the other conditions 
that must be satisfied in order for such liability to be incurred.’’
36  As already noted, the fact that the Commission could not initiate proceedings due to a violation of EU 
law goes in its favour.
37  Under Annex VII to the Act of Accession, entitled ‘Specific commitments undertaken by the Republic 
of Croatia’ in the accession negotiations (referred to in Article 36(1), second subparagraph, of the Act 
of Accession)’’, Commitment I provides: “To continue to ensure effective implementation of its Judicial 
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has been no violation by the national authorities. The Croatian Government could 
use this as defence in the proceedings before the national court and claim that the 
General Court itself concluded that there had been no violation (as confirmed by 
the Court of Justice on appeal). In our opinion, the General Court overstepped 
the limits of its jurisdiction, because it was asked to determine whether the EU 
had been obliged to compensate damage, and not to decide on the liability of the 
member state, which it would be authorized to do only in the context of an action 
under Article 258 TFEU (the so-called infringement procedure). 
Thirdly, in the pending national proceedings, the competent court could refer a 
preliminary question on interpretation of relevant provisions of the Act of Acces-
sion.38 This begs the question: in confirming the decision of the General Court by 
dismissing the application, had the Court of Justice pre judged its decision on the 
preliminary question?
Fourthly, a particularly controversial issue in the case was whether the Commis-
sion had discretionary power to “interfere with” the contractual provisions of the 
Act of Accession(to authorize reinstating of agreed special obligations to the ju-
dicial enforcement system) and what degree of discretion it enjoyed. If the Com-
mission did have the said discretionary power (which does not follow from any of 
the provisions of the Accession Treaty or any of the provisions of EU law), was it 
obliged to take into account the EU values and violation of a higher principle of 
law (legal certainty, legitimate expectations), its obligations under the Accession 
Treaty, the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Articles 2, 13 
and 17 TEU? 
In our view, the Commission as the “guardian of the Treaty” should have and was 
allowed to act only within the limits of the powers as conferred to it under the 
Treaties, to enjoy the discretion only in negotiations (which ceased upon conclu-
sion of the Accession Treaty). But even if the Commission (contrary to Article 
26 of the Vienna Convention) did have the discretion to negotiate with Croatia 
amendments to the Accession Treaty (as concluded with member states of the 
EU), the liability for damage caused to the public bailiffs would still exist given 
the “sufficiently grave violation of higher principles of law for the protection of 
individuals.”
Reform Strategy and Action Plan.” See par. 2 of judgment in Joined cases Šumelj and Others v Commis-
sion T-546/13, T-108/14 and T-109/14, op.cit. note 26.
38  We found this possible because in its nature the Act of Accession is an international treaty and Court 
of Justice has jurisdiction to interpret international treaties in the course of preliminary ruling proce-
dure.For more about preliminary ruling procedure in general see: Petrašević T., Prethodni postupak pred 
Sudom EU, Pravni fakultet u Osijeku, Gradska tiskara d.d., Osijek, 2014.
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Fifthly, it remains unclear why the CJEU (both General court and Court of Jus-
tice) gave perfunctory or no answers to one of the most important questions. 
Namely, Article 36 to the Act of Accession as an integral part of the Treaty of Ac-
cession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union indisputably provides 
for obligation of the Commission to monitor all commitments undertaken by 
Croatia in the accession negotiations, including those which must be achieved 
before or by the date of accession and to focus such monitoring in particular on 
commitments undertaken by Croatia in the area of the judiciary and fundamental 
rights (Annex VII). As an integral part of its regular monitoring and report tables 
preceding the accession of Croatia, the Commission issued six-month assessments 
of the commitments undertaken by Croatia in these areas. In the proceedings 
before the General Court, the Commission did not present any serious/valid rea-
sons to Croatia that would underlie the Commission’s approval to change the 
agreed special commitments (a legal concept of extrajudicial enforcement that 
was not given the opportunity to prove its effectiveness) by introducing a judicial 
enforcement system, seeing as how the introduction of public bailiffs was one of 
the reasons for closing Chapter 23, whereon the Commission insisted and which 
it financed within the IPA 2010 “Improvement of the Enforcement system in the 
Republic of Croatia.” Thus, the key and manifest violation of contractual obliga-
tions was by no means explained, much less sanctioned by the CJEU.
We will point at the contradictions in the decision of the General Court below. 
In par. 57 of its decision, the view of the General Court is as follows: ‘’It therefore 
does not follow from any of the commitments in Annex VII to the Act of Accession 
on which the applicants rely that the Republic of Croatia was under an obligation to 
establish the profession of public bailiff, or that the Commission was under any obliga-
tion to have recourse, on that basis, to the means of action provided for in Article 36 of 
the Act of Accession in order to prevent the repeal of the Public Bailiffs Act.’’ 
yet in par. 52, the General Court (directly contrary to the views of par. 47 to 51 
and par. 57) concludes: ‘’It cannot be inferred, however, that the Croatian authori-
ties, including those in place as a result of a new political majority, as was the case of 
the authorities who postponed and then repealed the Public Bailiffs Act, had unlimited 
discretion to amend the Judicial Reform Strategy 2011-2015 and the 2010 Action 
Plan. In view of the provisions of the Act of Accession, in particular Article 36 and 
Annex VII, those authorities were required to comply not only with commitment 1 but 
also with all the other commitments referred to in that annex, including commitments 
2, 3, 6 and 9, on which the applicants rely.’’
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Thus, par. 57 reads as the Croatian Government not having had an obligation 
to establish the profession of public bailiff, whereas in par. 52 the General Court 
states that the very same authorities did not have discretion to change the “Strat-
egy” and that they were obliged to comply with their commitments, primarily 
Commitment I. It is unclear to us what the General Court implied by that. The 
vagueness of the decisions of the CJEU in general has already been pointed out by 
some authors such as Hartely.39
Moreover, in par. 47 to 51 of its decision, the General Court – contrary to fun-
damental principles of law in our view – states that Commitment 40 is not aimed 
at a specific judicial reform strategy and action plan that were in force at the time 
of conclusion of negotiations up to abolishing of the act governing the public 
bailiff service. This was explained by the fact that the Commission identified in 
several later documents a different judicial reform strategy and action plan that no 
longer provided for public bailiffs. The General Court thus did not acknowledge 
the fact that the applicants were appointed as public bailiffs at the time of closing 
of Chapter 23, i.e. upon adoption of the Judiciary Reform, part of which were 
the public bailiffs. We gather that, precisely by conclusion of negotiations and 
the Treaty of Accession of Croatia to the EU; bearing in mind Article 26 to the 
Vienna Convention,41 the applicants did have legitimate expectations in terms of 
the commencement of their chosen profession. 
Lastly, the General Court in par. 55 states that the applicants do not indicate any 
specific violation other than breach of the principle of protection of legitimate ex-
pectations, even though they did refer to the principle of non-discrimination, the 
violation of the right to labour and invoked legal security throughout the entire 
proceedings. 
4.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Given the facts of the case Šumelj and Others v the Commission as presented 
herein, it must have seemed more than logical to bring two actions – one before 
the national court against the Republic of Croatia and one before the General 
Court against the Commission (i.e. the EU). Albeit the applicants did not explic-
itly indicate joint liability in their application, it can be inferred indirectly. What 
39  See:Hartley, T.C, op.cit. note 3, p. 58. For more details on the reasoning of the decisions of the CJEU, 
see: Beck, G., The legal reasoning of the Court of Justice, Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, 2012.
40  Op. cit. note 26.
41  Article 26 refers to the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
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the General Court could have done is stay the proceedings pending the decision 
of the national court, but instead it examined the merits. 
The applicants based the action for damages on the provisions of Article 340(2) 
TFEU from which it clearly follows that in terms of non-contractual liability, the 
Union is obliged, in accordance with general principles of rights common to the 
legal systems of member states, to make good any damage caused by its institu-
tions or by its servants in the performance of their duties. Thus, bearing in mind 
the previously cited provision, it emerges unequivocally that the EU, and not the 
member states, is liable for any damage caused by its institutions, i.e. that no dis-
tinction is made between damage caused to nationals of a member state of the EU 
and damage caused to nationals of a non-EU country. The above finding is logical 
when keeping in mind that the EU respects and promotes legal values; it would 
therefore be inconceivable for the EU to discriminate against persons based on the 
principle of holding a nationality of a member state of the European Union, i.e. 
for the liability for damage to be borne only toward nationals of member states 
of the EU. It is the very sense of the provision of Article 340(2) TFEU that the 
EU bear any damage in terms of non-contractual liability, and toward all, without 
exception, whom the damage was caused to as a result of unlawful or wrongful 
conduct of its body (in this particular case the Commission), provided that it 
meets the remaining conditions of liability for damage.
There was a founded concern that the General Court might dismiss the applica-
tion rationae temporis, and such decision would find a foothold in the case law. 
Such was the position of the General Court in the case Ynos.42 It involved a pre-
liminary question of a Hungarian court that was rejected by the CJEU because the 
case was out of scope rationae temporis. The CJEU gave a very brief decision stat-
ing inadmissibility because the facts of the case in the main proceedings preceded 
Hungary’s accession to the EU.43 In view of the above, the General Court did the 
right thing and granted the application. 
Our conclusion is that the “breach” was constituted by the Croatian Government 
by abolishing the institution of public bailiffs and that the Commission legiti-
mized this by not taking adequate measures and by issuing a positive report on the 
42  See case: C-302/04Ynos kft v János Varga [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:9.
43  Petrašević, T., Implementation of Preliminary Ruling Procedure in the legal systems of New member states 
and experiences for future member states as Croatia, in  Cross-border and EU legal issues: Hungary - 
Croatia / Drinoczi, T., Takacs, T. (eds.) Osijek-Pecs: Faculty of Law, Josip Juraj Strossmayer University; 
Pecs: Faculty of Law, University of Pecs, 2011, p. 558. For detailed analysis of case and critique on the 
CJEU see: Horvàthy, B., After the First Lessons and Experiences – Cases Concerning Hungary before ECJ 
(2004-2007), 49 Acta Juridica Hungarica, No. 1, 2008, p. 93.
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fulfilment of all obligations, based on which the Republic of Croatia signed the 
Association Agreement. Their joint liability undoubtedly exists.
We believe that the decisions of the General Court and the Court of Justice (on 
appeal) do not contribute to strengthening of the protection of the rights of the in-
dividual, but rather the opposite. Croatian citizens had greater expectations from 
the accession to the EU. They expected more “justice” and a stronger discipline 
of the “country.” The CJEU not only did not award damage compensation, but 
also potentially aggravated their legal position in the proceedings before national 
courts, for the reasons explained above. But after the negative decisions of the Eu-
ropean courts it only remains to wait for decision of national court(s). 
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